

Privacy in Internet Advertising: Not all adware is badware

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The Internet is (increasingly) not private

Companies like Google see what you search for, see which websites you visit

Social networks know your personal information


Why do they do this?

Lot's of reasons, but

Why do they do this?

Lot's of reasons, but

If you follow the money



Can we replace current advertising systems with one that is private enough, and targets at least as well?

Can we replace current advertising systems with one that is private enough, and targetable

- Follows today's business model
 - Advertisers bid for ad space, pay for clicks
 - Publishers provide ad space, get paid for clicks
- Deal with click fraud
- Scales adequately

Can we replace current advertising systems with one that is private enough, and targets at least as well?

- Most users don't care about privacy
- But privacy advocates do, and so do governments
- Privacy advocates need to be convinced

Can we replace current advertising systems with one that is private enough, and targets at least as well?



Our approach:

- “As private as possible”
- While still satisfying other goals
- Hope that this is good enough

Can we replace current advertising systems with one that is private enough , and **targets** at least as well?


A principle: Increased privacy begets better personalization

Today's advertising model




Client


Today's advertising model




Today's advertising model




Today's advertising model




Today's advertising model









Today's advertising model



Today's advertising model








Increasingly, the Broker stores information about the user

Today's advertising model



Privad: Basic Approach

Run profiling on the client

In other words, adware!


Push ads to clients, let client locally select ads to show

Clients anonymously report ad events, request classes of ads

Publishers




Broker




Advertisers



Dealer



Clients



Privad Basic
Architecture

Publishers

Advertisers

Broker


Dealer

Software
Agent

Generate user
profiles locally at
the client

In other words,
Adware!

Clients




Publishers

Advertisers

Broker

Dealer


Clients





Anonymizes
client-broker
communications

Cannot
eavesdrop

Helps with
clickfraud




Client/broker messages:
Contain minimal info (no PII)
Cannot be linked to same client







Clients



Unlinkability
and
anonymity








Dealer

Dealer and Software Agent
are new components

Clients



How are they incentivized?

Dealer

Dealer:

Legally bound to follow protocols, not collude

Execute open-source software, open to inspection



Dealer

Client:

Various options:




Provide benefit: free software, content,

Like adware!

Bundle with browser or OS

Clients





Please suspend disbelief, imagine that we succeed.....





Publishers

Advertisers

Perfectly
Private
Advertising
System

Clients







Ad

Ad targeted to:
"Man" AND
"Married" AND
"Has girlfriend"

Ad



Clients



Publishers

Advertisers

Perfectly
Private
Advertising
System

Click

Clients


U

SA

Advertiser gets
(very) personal
information
about users

*Honey, why are
you getting ads
for sexy lingerie?*





Privad: Basic Operation

Before
ad view

Client pulls (some set
of) ads from Broker

At ad
view

Client locally puts (a
subset of) ads in adboxes

After ad
view

Client reports
views/clicks to Broker

Client pulls ads from Broker


Client determines user interest

Currently we look at searches and
browsing on shopping sites

Pre-defined interest categories

Client requests ads related to interest

Client may reveal language and
region, but no other demographics







Key K unique to this request


Dealer knows Client requests some channel





Broker knows some Client requests this channel

Dealer cannot link requests







Relevant and non-relevant ads stored locally






Webpage
with
adbox







Ad is delivered locally




Minimal delay

May or may not be related to page context



View or click is reported to Broker via Dealer






Dealer learns client X clicked on some ad

Broker learns some client clicked on ad Y

At Broker, multiple clicks from same client appear as clicks from multiple clients



rid: Report ID

Unique for every report

Used to (indirectly) inform Dealer of suspected attacking Clients

Dealer remembers $\text{rid} \leftrightarrow \text{Client}$ mappings

Client with many reported rid's is suspect

Click Fraud

Thresholds: Dealer flags Clients with high subscriptions, clicks, views, CTR

Forces attacker to use botnet

Hard to use same botnet for multiple attacks

Blacklists: Dealers use lists of known bots (from antivirus or network telescope).

Dealers share list of banned clients

Limits time that botnet is valid

Click Fraud

Historical Statistics: Broker looks for deviations from normal advertiser or publisher activity

Use this to flag suspected reports

Forces gradual attacks

Honey-farms, Charge per action (not clicks),
“bait” ads,

Crypto Overhead

One public-key operation per view etc.

We can offload these to Clients:

1. Clients create public keys
2. Distribute keys to other Clients (via Broker and Dealers)
3. Encrypted messages delivered back to key-generating Clients for decryption

Other Challenges: Auctions


Private auction is distributed

Broker has some information (advertiser bid, budget, CTR), Client has other information (user preferences)

Must consider advertiser privacy

Advertiser doesn't want to reveal bid, budget, or CTR

Other Challenges: Privacy from advertisers



To an extent, can hide Client from advertiser

But ultimately user may reveal himself (i.e. through purchase)

Even a view report can reveal information

Must limit level of targeting, and avoid really sensitive advertising

Other Challenges: User Statistics

Broker and advertiser want to know deep *statistical* information about users

What kind of targeting works best?

When should ads be shown?

Are users interested in A also interested in B?

How can conversion rates be improved?

Centralized systems have full knowledge


How can Privad privately provide this information?

Differential Privacy


Differential Privacy adds noise to answers of DB queries

Such that presence or absence of single DB element cannot be determined


Normally modeled as a single trusted DB



Distributed Differential Privacy



Distributed Differential Privacy



Privad Project Status

Developing large-scale experiment

10,000's of Firefox clients




Ads derived from Amazon product API

Detect user interest from searching/browsing
on shopping web sites

No user demographics

Hope to show better CTR, scalability

adresearch.mpi-sws.org



Privad Basic Approach